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Available online 2 May 2008It is now widely recognized that technological change will play a
substantial role in reducing GHG emissions without compromising
economic growth; hence, any better understanding of the process of
technological innovation is likely to increase our knowledge of mitigation
possibilities and costs. This paper explores how international knowledge
ﬂows affect the dynamics of the domestic R&D sector and the main
economic and environmental variables. The analysis is performed using
WITCH, a dynamic regional model of the world economy, in which
energy-related technological change is endogenous. The focus is on
disembodied energy R&D international spillovers. The knowledge pool
fromwhich regions draw foreign ideas differs between High Income and
Low Income countries. Absorption capacity is also endogenous in the
model. The basic questions are as follows. Do knowledge spillovers
enhance energy-related technological innovation in different regions of
the world? Does the speed of innovation increase? Or do free-riding
incentives prevail and international spillovers crowd out domestic R&D
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2913V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929designed to enhance it? Do greenhouse gas stabilization costs drop in the
presence of international technological spillovers? The new speciﬁcation
of the WITCH model presented in this paper enables us to answer these
questions. Our analysis shows that international knowledge spillovers
tend to increase free-riding incentives and decrease the investments in
energy R&D. The strongest cuts in energy R&D investments are recorded
among High Income countries, where international knowledge ﬂows
crowd out domestic R&D efforts. The overall domestic pool of knowledge,
and thus total net GHG stabilization costs, remain largely unaffected.
International spillovers, however, are also an important policy channel.
We therefore analyze the implication of a policy-mix in which climate
policy is combined with a technology policy designed to enhance
absorption capacity in Low Income countries. Signiﬁcant positive
impacts on the costs of stabilizing GHG concentrations are singled out.
Finally, a sensitivity analysis shows that High Income countries are more
responsive than Low Income countries to changes in the parameters.
Additional empirical researchefforts should thusbe focusedon the former.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
It is now widely recognized that technological change will play a substantial role in reducing the cost of
stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. This is one of the reasons behind themany efforts recently
devoted to the development of Integrated Economy-Climate Models, in which technological change is
endogenous and responds to market and policy incentives. Signiﬁcant improvements in the estimate of
optimal abatement paths and costs have thus been achieved. In particular, by disentangling the determinants
of knowledge accumulation, and linking them to incentives arising from emission targets, it is nowpossible to
measure how climate policy-induced technological change reduces the costs of atmospheric stabilization
(Grubb et al., 2006). However, despite this encouraging progress, the knowledge accumulation processes are
still unclear, and the actual potential of technological innovation is far from being fully understood.
For example, only few studies on the economics of atmospheric stabilization have addressed the role of
international knowledge ﬂows in the process of knowledge production and accumulation.1 The transfer of
knowledge across countries is instead crucial in shaping the diffusion of new technologies and in spreading
basic scientiﬁc developments that gradually foster technological innovation in places different fromwhere
they were originally conceived. This is of central importance if we consider that new technologies are
created and developed in a handful of countries, and that still greater concentration is recorded for the
expenditure on energy R&D. However, despite its concentrated origin, knowledge clearly ﬂows across
countries: developing economies import goods and services that embody the technological progress made
in the laboratories of richer countries, and are increasingly exposed to the ﬂow of knowledge that circulates
among world research laboratories, the so-called disembodied knowledge ﬂows. There is also a rich
exchange of knowledge among industrialized countries, which often participate in joint research
agreements to share the costs and risks of the most expensive projects.2 It is therefore crucial to
understand how knowledge ﬂows across countries in order to correctly assess by how much and at what
cost technological change can increase energy efﬁciency and lower carbon intensity worldwide.ledge affects productivity of the energy input and reduces the emission output
equilibrium model to analyze the effect of endogenous technical change and
age. Kemfert (2005) contains some attempts to account for international
ows in a general equilibrium model. Some improvements are contained in
e et al. (2008) review the recent literature on technological change in models of
ethodological issues related to knowledge spillovers but they do not discuss
ter-sectoral spillovers.
search and development project that aims to demonstrate the scientiﬁc and
he project are the European Union, Japan, the People's Republic of China, India,
e USA.
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more technological cooperation is very attractive indeed, and has been emphasized by several authors (e.g.
Barrett, 1994, 2002; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1994; Grubb et al., 2002; Philibert, 2004; Buchner et al., 2005). On
these grounds, any policy aimed at increasing the circulation of world knowledge should be promoted. For
example, favourable treatment could be dispensed to knowledge ﬂows, disclosure of sensitive information
could be encouraged and joint development programs could be ﬁnanced to increase knowledge sharing and
the productivity of R&D efforts. These proposals have also captivated the interest of policy makers: the basic
idea of knowledge transfers is at the core of the recent Asia-Paciﬁc agreement on climate change control.
However, the enhanced circulation of ideas and the free dissemination of technological innovation
throughout the world do not necessarily imply that total global innovation will increase and abatement
costs decrease. Several obstacles have been identiﬁed (Cf. Carraro, 2001 for a survey). For example, a given
country may not have the capacity to absorb the ﬂow of ideas and research results coming from other
countries. Knowledge from international spillovers may crowd out domestic R&D efforts. Free-riding
incentivesmay induce some countries to reduce their own expenditures in Research and Development. The
basic questions are therefore as follows. Do knowledge spillovers enhance energy technological innovation
in different regions of the world? Do spillovers increase R&D expenditures? Or do free-riding incentives
prevail and international spillovers crowd out domestic R&D efforts? What is the role of domestic
absorption capacity and of policies designed to enhance it? And ﬁnally, do greenhouse gas stabilization
costs drop in the presence of international technological spillovers? The newmodel speciﬁcation presented
in this paper enables us to answer these questions.
We address both researchers and policymakers by discussingmodelling issues and analysing possible cost
reductions achievable by greater knowledge diffusion. Our exploration of the role of international knowledge
spilloverswill be based on a newversion ofWITCH, a dynamic regionalmodel of theworld economy, inwhich
energy-related technological change is endogenous and free-riding incentives from R&D spillovers and other
sources are also accounted for. Although embodied technology transfers play an important role in spreading
technical know-how across theworld, we focus our analysis on disembodied knowledge spillovers, i.e. on the
positive externality that emerges from the exposure to foreignpatents, scientists, laboratories and blueprints.3
In this paper, we disentangle three main issues that a modeller faces when dealing with international
knowledge spillovers: ﬁrst, we have to deﬁne the size and the characteristics of the international knowledge
pool from which each country picks ideas to implement at home. Viewing the issue from another
perspective, are knowledge stocks cumulated in different countries heterogeneous or homogeneous, and if
they are a mix, to what degree do they overlap? Second, we must consider the process of knowledge
absorption: are spillovers a “manna from heaven” that indiscriminately falls in each country, regardless of
its degree of technological development, or is some domestic effort necessary to absorb foreign
knowledge? Third, how do spillovers interact with the domestic knowledge production sector? Do patents,
blueprints produced abroad, substitute those discovered at home?
Unfortunately, the limited empirical work on energy efﬁciency R&D spillovers does not provide us with
clear indications on the most appropriate model speciﬁcation.4 We therefore make and compare some
reasonable assumptions on absorption capacity, on the available international knowledge pool, and on the
interactions between international spillovers and the domestic R&D sector. These assumptions are then
integrated into the equations of the WITCH model. This is then used to analyze how costs and beneﬁts of
GHG stabilization policy are affected by the presence of international R&D spillovers, to deﬁne the impact of
international spillovers on domestic R&D efforts, and to determine what policy can be designed to enhance
the dissemination of energy-saving technologies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy introduces the WITCHmodel and discusses
our modelling of R&D spillovers. Section 3 presents the calibration results, a new baseline, and analyzes the
dynamics of stabilization investments in R&D when international spillovers are explicitly modelled. In this
section, we also present our new results on the costs and beneﬁts of GHG stabilization policy. Section 4
discusses a policy-mix inwhich climate policy is combinedwith anR&D incentive schemedesigned to enhance
the absorption capacity in developing countries, and thus the dissemination of new energy technologies.
Section 5 shows the main outputs of our sensitivity analysis. A concluding section summarizes our results.3 For the role of trade in spreading technological knowledge see Keller (1997), Coe andHelpman (1995), Eaton andKortum (1996,1999).
4 See Lanjouw and Mody (1996) for an analysis of innovation and international diffusion of environmental responsive technology.
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2.1. Short model description
WITCH–World InducedTechnical ChangeHybrid– is a regional integratedassessmentmodel structured to
providenormative informationon the optimal responses ofworld economies to climate damages. It is a hybrid
model because it combines features of both top–down and bottom–upmodelling: the top–down component
consists of an inter-temporal optimal growth model in which the energy input of the aggregate production
function has been integrated into a bottom–up like description of the energy sector. World countries are
grouped in 12 regions that strategically interact when determining their optimal policies. A game theoretic
framework is adopted to capture these strategic interactions. A climatemodule and a damage functionprovide
the feedback on the economy of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere.
WITCH's top–down framework guarantees a coherent, fully inter-temporal allocation of investments
that have an impact on the level of mitigation— R&D effort, investments in energy technologies, fossil fuel
expenditures. The regional speciﬁcation of the model and the presence of interdependencies among
regions – through CO2, exhaustible natural resources, trade and technological spillovers – allow us to
account for the incentives to free-ride. By solving an open-loop Nash game, the investment strategies are
optimized taking into account both economic and environmental externalities.
WITCH contains a detailed representation of the energy sector, which allows the model to produce a
reasonable characterization of future energy and technological scenarios and an assessment of their
compatibility with the goal of stabilizing greenhouse gases concentrations. In addition, by endogenously
modelling fuel (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium) prices, as well as the cost of storing the CO2 captured, the
model can be used to evaluate the implication of mitigation policies on the energy system in all its
components. In the next sub-sections, we focus on the representation of technical change; for a thorough
description of the model, see Bosetti et al. (2006, 2007).
2.2. Endogenous technical change (ETC) in the WITCH model
Energy-related technological change is endogenous inWITCH. Thanks to the hybrid nature of the model, we
portray endogenous technological change both in its bottom–up and top–down dimensions: R&D investments
designed to enhance energy efﬁciency increase the productivity of energy inputs in generating energy services;
growing expertise driven by Learning-by-Doing (LbD) reduces the cost of power generation plants.
Following Popp (2004), in country n at time t, technological advances are captured by a stock of
knowledge, HE(n,t), combined with energy, EN(n,t), in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function
that simulates the production of energy services, ES(n,t), demanded by the ﬁnal good production sector:5 Acc
This intES n; tð Þ ¼ aHHE n; tð ÞqþaENEN n; tð Þq½  1=q: ð1Þ
e R&D sector exhibits inter-temporal spillovers and the production of new “ideas” follows an innovationTh
possibility frontier (Kennedy, 1964): knowledge is produced by “standing on the shoulders” of the nation's
giants: investment in R&D is combined with the stock of ideas already discovered and produces new
knowledgewhichwill be the base for new discoveries in the following years. A similar description of the R&D
sector can be found in the seminal paper by Romer (1990), inwhich the research sector productivity increases
proportionally with the stock of knowledge cumulated in the past, giving rise to endogenous growth. Using
data on patent citations, Jaffe et al. (1993), Trajtenberg et al. (1992) and Caballero and Jaffe (1993), have found
evidence of state dependence at the industry level.5 In the speciﬁc narrower scope of our analysis, Popp (2002)
ﬁnds that the energy R&D sector exhibits diminishing returns. Denoting R&D Investments with I, the
production of new ideas in country n at time t, Z, is modelled as follows:Z n; tð Þ ¼ aI n; tð ÞbHE n; tð Þc; ð2Þording to Rosenberg (1994), not only does technological progress in one nation show state dependence, but also path dependence.
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ideas not fruitful for the purposeof current innovation activity, the lawofmotionof theR&Dstock is as follows:HE n; t þ 1ð Þ ¼ HE n; tð Þ 1 dð Þ þ Z n; tð Þ: ð3Þ
ce in the present speciﬁcation of themodel we do not explicitly model non-energy R&D, we assume anSin
exogenous crowdingout effect between energy and non-energy R&D.6We represent aggregated economies in
which domestic externalities are fully internalized and the relevant return of investment is the social one,
higher than the private one. The model is calibrated to address this discrepancy and returns to R&D are set in
linewith the empirical literature to be four times higher than those for other investments, the externalities of
which are instead assumed to be negligible. We do realize that our view on the knowledge failures of the
domestic market is optimistic, but modelling non-cooperative knowledge markets in a computationally
tractable way – also at the regional level – is a complex task that awaits further development of the model
framework, Thus, the total cost of energy R&D investments is as in Eq. (4):COSTR&D t;nð Þ ¼ I n; tð Þ þ 4wI ntð Þ: ð4Þ
ereψ is the crowding out parameterwhichmeasures howmany dollars of generic R&D investment areWh
lost per each dollar of energy R&D investment. We set ψ=0.5 as in Popp (2004).
2.3. International R&D spillovers
Researchers do not only “stand on the shoulders” of their predecessors but also on those of their
neighbours.7 Knowledge ﬂows across countries, either embodied in traded goods or disembodied in
blueprints, patents, exchanges of ideas between researchers, and imitation. We concentrate here on
disembodied knowledge spillovers.8 Since WITCH is a multiregional model, we can accommodate for the
effect of disembodied knowledge spillovers by introducing a transmission channel across energy R&D
sectors in each region. Thus, the implications of these spillovers for investments in the creation of new
ideas, climate policy costs and energy demand can all be analyzed.
Unfortunately, the empirical analysis of international spillovers induced by energy-saving R&D investments
is almost non-existent, and it is thus not possible to derive useful modelling insights. After comparing several
alternative speciﬁcations of the equations representing technology spillovers in the model, here is the one that
we propose as the most reliable. Countries/regions are exposed to a pool of world knowledge that can be
considered as a global public good. A fraction of this knowledge is absorbed by each country and is available for
use in the domestic R&D sector. Different assumptions can be made on (1) the characteristics of world
knowledge, on (2) theprocess of absorption andon (3) theway inwhichcountries use this available information.
We follow this three-step approach to highlight themost relevant issues and to illustrate ourmodelling choices.
2.4. International knowledge pool
We consider two distinct views of the pool of international knowledge. In the ﬁrst, technological
development is seen as a process inwhich all countriesmoveupwards on the sameknowledge ladder,with the
least technologically advanced lying at the bottomand the technological innovator at the top; each regionhas a
distinct position along the ladder at any time. Only knowledge still not possessed is attractive. Innovators
receive scarceor nobeneﬁt fromexposure to international knowledgewhile laggards harvest substantial gains.
This was the view of technological progress put forward by Gerschenkron (1962) in his famous essay Economica study on R&D crowding out in the short and medium term see Goolsbee (1998).
Chapter 11 in Rosenberg (1982).
modelwith trade of heterogeneous intermediate andﬁnal goods itwouldbe possible to give amore comprehensive description of
dge ﬂows. However, by modelling disembodied knowledge ﬂows we concentrate on the circulation of frontier technological
ments that will be crucial for achieving high levels of energy efﬁciency. The importance of disembodied knowledge ﬂows for
efﬁciency improvements should not be underestimated also in the case of Low Income countries. Consider for example the
dge necessary for the much needed improvements in electricity grids development and management in countries like China.
al knowledge, processes and management software developed elsewhere will certainly improve efﬁciency and increase
mental beneﬁts (see Guo et al, 2000; Streets, 2003; for electric grids in South Africa see Graebera et al., 2005). We thank David
an for suggesting us examples of the importance of disembodied knowledge ﬂows for Developing Countries.
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with advancedeconomies at a relatively fast pace.More recently, the ideaof knowledge that trickles down from
the technological frontier to the technological laggards was explored by Acemoglu et al. (2006).
In our second description of world knowledge, we assume that countries move, at least partially, along
independent technological patterns, and thus all external knowledge adds new insights to the domestic
knowledge capital. Rosenberg (1994), in his second exploration of technological development, argues that
indeed the technological development of countries tends to follow speciﬁc patterns inﬂuenced by the
sequence of particular events which constitutes the history of the system. According to this view, the very
same history of countries, their different regulatory regimes, and their economic and social environments,
are drivers of technological differentiation. Indeed, for energy technologies we record a similar pattern of
R&D and technology discoveries, and a clear example of path-dependent technological progress is the
success of the wind industry in Europe. When technologies tend to diverge, spillovers are a great source of
beneﬁt because they ﬁll in important gaps that might otherwise remain unexplored.
According to the ﬁrst view, the knowledge pool accessible to each region is represented by the
technology that lies unexplored between the knowledge stock of any one country and the innovator's
knowledge stock, whereas according to the second view, the knowledge pool is represented by the overall
amount ofworld knowledge detained by other countries. Both these two representations of the pool of ideas
available to each country capture some interesting and important features of the process of technology
diffusion. In our analysis, we assume that the ﬁrst view prevails in Low Income countries. Therefore, for Low
Income countries, the absorption of knowledge from the innovator is the prevailing effect to model, the
Gerschenkron effect. The second view, the situation described by Rosenberg with heterogeneous
knowledge stocks, is to be preferred for High Income countries.
We combine these two different representations in one single formulation by assuming that the tech-
nological frontier is set not only by a single innovator but by the whole group of High Income countries, i.e.
that the technological frontier is measured by the sum of the stocks of R&D capital detained by these
countries. High Income countries may draw from the knowledge stock of all other High Income countries,
while the Low Income countries' knowledge pool consists of the knowledge accumulated in the more
advanced economies (those setting the world's technological frontier). For Low Income countries, we
describe the process of technological advancement as an upwardmovement along a technology ladder; the
gap to ﬁll is measured by the difference between each country's R&D knowledge stock and the technological
frontier capital. At high levels of technological development, however, countries specialize in different
energy R&D paths and thus they have the opportunity to beneﬁt from all other High Income countries' R&D
stocks, which constitute the knowledge pool. By assuming a technological frontier determined bymore than
one country, we avoid the case of one single world leader, which cannot absorb any valuable knowledge
from its followers, which is highly unrealistic when not dealing with a speciﬁc industry. If we deﬁne HI as




circulatKP n; tð Þ ¼
X
naHI
HE n; tð Þ  HE n; tð Þ; ð5Þ
HE is the regional stock of knowledge as deﬁned in Eq. (3).92.5. Knowledge absorption
Moving to the second logical step, we assume that only a fraction γ(n,t) of the world's available pool of
knowledge is absorbed by each country. The absorption parameter γ might be an indicator of industrial
policy or of the legal environment, or a measure of some effort to absorb international knowledge. We
consider γ as being primarily a function of domestic knowledge. In this we follow Cohen and Levinthal
(1989), whowere the ﬁrst to suggest that the process of learning, far from being free, is costly and that most
of this cost is borne by a stock of knowledge cumulated in the receiving country. Keller (2004) reinforcesKnowledge Pool measures the widest possible inﬂow of knowledge and it is constructed assuming that knowledge is a
public good, free to ﬂow from one country to another. However, by including absorption capacity in our formulation, we have
rated an endogenous upper bound to knowledge appropriability which mimics exogenous constraints to knowledge
ion.
2918 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929this position in his survey of international knowledge spillovers by showing that an R&D effort is needed to
absorb international knowledge. By means of an empirical analysis of spillovers across OECD
manufacturing industries, Kneller (2005) ﬁnds that absorptive capacity, rather than physical distance,
plays an important role in determining the amount of knowledge transfers at the international level. Also
Grifﬁth et al. (2003) ﬁnd that R&D increases the absorption of knowledge spillovers and that neglecting this
“second face” of knowledge investments necessarily leads to an underestimation of R&D's social rate of
return. Accordingly, we assume that the absorption capacity γ(n,t) is a function of the distance of R&D
capital accumulated in the region with respect to the technological frontier. We use the ratio of one











declining n; tð Þ ¼ HE n; tð ÞP
naHI HE n; tð Þ
: ð6Þ
e further one country lies from the technological frontier, the lesser this country is able to absorbTh
knowledge from the potentially available international knowledge pool. In other words, the lack of
laboratories, scientiﬁc bodies, investments in R&D in Low Income countries is a serious obstacle to the
proﬁtable use of the knowledge that circulates in the world. The low absorptive capacity of Low Income
countries realistically reduces the potentially very large inﬂow of knowledge from the technological frontier
which determines the overall amount of knowledge spillovers. More in general, according to our modelling
choice, also for High Income Countries absorption capacity is lower than one. Knowledge absorption is in
fact determined by a wide variety of factors besides the level of technical expertise of the recipient.
Exogenous factors such as patent policy, for example, can represent an important limitation to the
appropriability of foreign knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).10 Our modelling choices also,
realistically, imply that High Income Countries may see their absorptive capacity decline over time if
they do not innovate at the same pace of their advanced partners. This is indeed true for all technological
breakthroughs that disrupt the paradigms in a discipline: even if close to the frontier, countries lagging
behind might fail to reap any beneﬁt from these new discoveries.
Accordingly, the spillover of international knowledge in region n at time t, SPILL(n,t), is obtained by
multiplying the Knowledge Pool and the absorption capacity:ð7ÞSPILL n; tð Þ ¼ g n; tð ÞdKP n; tð Þ ¼ HE n; tð ÞP
naHI HE j; tð Þ
X
naHI
HE n; tð Þ  HE n; tð Þ
h i
tice that this formulation implies that spillovers are a bell-shaped function of the country's R&DNo
knowledge stock. For Low Income countries, the peak of the curve lies halfway from the technological
frontier. They start from very low absorption capacity levels and a very high knowledge pool, then
progressively increase their knowledge stock and absorption capacity, but potential knowledge inﬂows
diminish as they approach the technological frontier.11 Spillovers are thus ﬁrst increasing and then
decreasing along the transition from low to high technological progress levels. This mechanism guarantees
relatively higher knowledge inﬂows to Low Income countries and increases the convergence among the
two groups of countries. For High Income countries, spillovers increase until the knowledge stock of one
country is equal to the sum of the knowledge stock of all the other High Income countries.002, the base year, γ is equal to 0.38 for USA, 0.31 for Europe (OLDEURO) and 0.26 for Japan (CAJANZ). The analytical framework
o ours that has been tested empirically is in Cohen and Levinthal (1989). They assume that the absorption capacity γ, which is a
function of R&D investments, varies between 0 and 1; exogenous factors however limit the full absorption potential of a ﬁrm and
ltiply the absorption rate by a parameter θ for which they ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant value that ranges between 0.4 and 0.26.
suming full knowledge-based absorption capacity, we obtain values for γwhich are in line with empirical estimates.
term of comparison, in the stabilization exercise that we discuss in Section 3, the absorption rate is equal to 0.02 for China
8 for the USA; the ratio of Chinese to USA Knowledge Pools is instead 1.6. At the beginning of the simulation timeframe, the
international spillovers to the domestic R&D knowledge stock is 0.98 for China and 0.62 for the USA. Spillovers are relatively
or Low Income countries throughout the century: the same ratio in 2102 is 0.83 for China and 0.71 for the USA. Overall R&D
dge stocks partially converge over the century, with the ratio of Chinese to USA R&D capital jumping from 0.05 to 0.56. Also,
wledge intensities of the two economies (Energy R&D capital to GDP ratios) converge over the century, with their ratio
g from 2.7 to 1.5. We thus allow steady, although incomplete, convergence in knowledge stocks across the century.
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The third and ﬁnal step consists in deﬁning how countries use the spillover in their process of
knowledge generation. We assume that spillovers enter the domestic R&D sector as an input in the
innovation possibility frontier. Thanks to this highly standardized aggregation of different production
inputs we can control for the elasticity of the production of new ideas to international R&D spillovers, i.e.







their reZ n; tð Þ ¼ a nð ÞIR&D n; tð ÞbHE n; tð ÞcSPILL n; tð Þd: ð8Þ2.7. Synthesis
In the previous sub-sections, we described the logical steps that have been followed to introduce
international energy R&D spillovers in theWITCHmodel. There is a variety of other available options thatwere
considered and explored. However, the one chosen is the strongest from a theoretical point of view, and it has
the advantageof being tractable andeasily understandable,while capturing themost interestingeffects atwork.
Notice that in our framework the public good features of the knowledge pool are somehow mitigated.
Were knowledge a fully global public good, the incentive to free-riding would dominate, regions would
invest less in technology R&D and the overall production of knowledge would shrink.13 On the contrary, by
giving knowledge a role in the process of knowledge absorption and by letting international R&D spillovers
augment the productivity of domestic investment, we have introduced forces that work against the free-
riding incentive. This is in accordance with the literature on knowledge spillovers. As an example, Cohen
and Levinthal (1989) have shown that when domestic R&D increases absorption capacity and some general
conditions hold, the incentive to invest more in R&D offsets the disincentive represented by free-riding, and
world investments in R&D eventually increase.
3. Calibration, new baseline and the effects of spillovers on GHG stabilization
Summing up, the new equation that describes the process of technology creation in country n at time t
is as follows:Z n; tð Þ ¼ aIR&D n; tð ÞbHE n; tð Þc HE n; tð ÞP
naHI HE n; tð Þ
X
naHI
HE n; tð Þ  HE n; tð Þ
h i d
ð9Þ
set the parameter d to be equal to 0.15, i.e. an increase of 1% of international spillovers increases theWe
output of domestic ideas by 0.15%. Since, to our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence that attributes the
value of the elasticity of knowledge generation to international spillovers,we have chosen here a value slightly
lower than the elasticity of knowledge production to domestic investments (equal to 0.18), and about one third
of the elasticitywith respect to past knowledge stock,which is equal to 0.53 in themodelwithout spillovers (as
in Popp, 2004). Thus, we give priority to domestic investments in generating new discoveries, andwe assume
that inter-temporal knowledge spillovers are stronger than the international ones. The effects and the
robustness of this choice are tested through an appropriate sensitivity analysis (see Section 5).
We calibrated the new knowledge innovation frontier so as to reproduce the same time path of the R&D
knowledge stock that the model displays in the baseline without international spillovers, along the whole
optimization period;14 this also yields exactly equal paths for output and for all energy variables and a veryan analogous aggregation of spillovers to domestic investment and capital stock see Acemoglu (2002), p. 793.
standard result that sees free-riding effects dominate has also been questioned by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), who
ow, in a cooperative setting with strong knowledge ﬂows, spillovers induce higher overall investment in R&D due to the full
lization of positive externalities.
choose to act on R&D stocks rather than on investments because we are primarily concerned with preserving energy
ies trends as in the baseline without spillovers. Energy intensities — determined by R&D stocks with our modelling
tions — were calibrated on historical trends and thus represent a good benchmark that we want to preserve, especially for
levance in determining carbon emissions.
Table 1
Reduction of R&D investments when spillovers are modelled
2022 (%) 2042 (%) 2062 (%) 2082 (%) 2102 (%)
USA −5.2 −4.2 −3.3 −2.6 −1.8
OLDEURO −3.8 −3.2 −2.6 −2.1 −1.4
NEWEURO −0.3 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.4
KOSAU −2.0 −1.9 −1.7 −1.4 −1.0
CAJANZ −3.3 −2.8 −2.2 −1.8 −1.2
TE −1.0 −1.3 −1.3 −1.2 −0.9
MENA −2.2 −2.5 −2.5 −2.4 −2.0
SSA 0.6 −0.3 −0.4 −0.4 −0.4
SASIA −1.2 −1.7 −1.8 −1.7 −1.3
CHINA −1.8 −2.4 −2.4 −2.2 −1.7
EASIA −1.4 −1.9 −2.0 −1.9 −1.5
LACA −2.0 −2.2 −2.1 −1.9 −1.4
WORLD −3.5 −2.9 −2.5 −2.0 −1.5
HIGH INCOME −4.1 −3.4 −2.7 −2.1 −1.5
LOW INCOME −1.7 −2.1 −2.1 −2.0 −1.6
2920 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929similar time evolution for R&D investments. Calibration was performed by reducing c in Eq. (9) so as to
accommodate for the new input. By explicitly modelling international spillovers, we can separate the two
“standing-on-shoulders” effects and attribute a correct nationality to the “giants” on which present
researchers stand. Decreasing returns to scale are preserved. New values for parameter c are country- and
time-speciﬁc.15
We tested the abovemodelling choices by computing the costs and beneﬁts of a 450 stabilization policy,
i.e. a policy aimed at stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 450 ppmv (550 ppmvwhen considering
all gases) at the end of the 21st century.16We computed the effects of this stabilization policy bothwith and
without international energy R&D spillovers. The two might in principle be very different, as the versions
with and without spillovers have been calibrated to be the same only in the baseline scenario.
In the WITCH model, the group of High Income countries is composed by USA, OLDEURO, NEWEURO,
KOSAU (Korea, South Africa and Australia), CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New Zeland), while all other regions are
labelled as Low Income.17 A world ceiling on emissions across the century is derived consistently from the
stabilization target and emission allowances are distributed across world regions according to the
Sovereignty rule, i.e. each year regions receive a fraction of permits equal to their share of world emissions
in the base year 2002. This distribution scheme is, of course, highly questionable, but it provides a good
testing ground to study policies to redistribute the effort of stabilization from Low Income to High Income
countries. The latter may design policies to compensate Low Income countries for any distribution of
permits that is considered inequitable, as will be shown in Section 4. A world carbon market equalizes
marginal abatement costs worldwide.18
Table 1 shows a ﬁrst important result: although our modelling choices rule out strong spillover effects,
world investments inR&Dare always lowerwhen spillovers are accounted for. The gap is about 3.5% in theﬁrst
decades of the century and then progressively declines to 1.5% at the end of the century. Greater discrepancies
are recorded if we look at more disaggregated data. High Income countries reduce investments the most, by
cutting 4.1% of their R&D effort at the beginning of the century. This ﬁgure then decreases gradually to 1.5% at15 The sum of the calibrated c and d is very close to the original value of 0.52, which was used for c alone. Variation over time is
extremely limited: for the USA the recalibrated c is equal to 0.401 in 2002 and to 0.391 in 2102; for CHINA the change is even less
pronounced, from 0.386 to 0.387 over the century.
16 The emission path consistent with the chosen stabilization target is obtained by running the cooperative solution of the WITCH
model, in which all externalities are internalized, and is thus the efﬁcient one.
17 The aggregation of countries into twelve world regions is described in Bosetti et al. (2007) and can also be found at www.feem-
web.it/witch.
18 A distribution of emission allowances according to the “Equal per Capita” rule has also been tested. There are only very minor
differences in R&D investments and all the results illustrated in this section are conﬁrmed. The reason is that the carbon price is
independent of the distribution of permits, as expected from the theoretical prediction of the Coase theorem, and income effects
have only mild impacts on investment choices.
Table 2
Variation of share of high income countries investments
2022 (%) 2042 (%) 2062 (%) 2082 (%) 2102 (%)
USA −1.2 −0.9 −0.7 −0.5 −0.3
OLDEURO 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
NEWEURO 4.0 3.0 2.2 1.6 1.1
KOSAU 2.2 1.5 1.0 0.7 0.4
CAJANZ 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2
2921V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929the end of the simulation period. For Low Income countries we record only a mild 1.7% reduction in the ﬁrst
decades, thena slightlygreater gapat themiddleof the centurywhen theycut their efforts by2.1%, andﬁnallya
decline to a 1.6% reduction at the end of the century. The difference in behaviour between High and Low
Incomecountriesduring theﬁrst decadesof the century is explainedby the fact that, for Low Incomecountries,
spillovers increase at a faster rate as they augment their knowledge stocks and move along the bell-shaped
curve that governs knowledge inﬂows, as explained in the previous section.
It is also worth noting that among High Income countries the greatest reductions are recorded in USA,
OLDEURO and CAJANZ, with the greatest difference found in USA, the smallest in CAJANZ, and OLDEURO in
the middle. Investments decrease less in KOSAU and NEWEUROPE, the other two High Income countries,
than in the top three countries/regions and in both, the share of investments at the frontier, i.e. the share of
all High Income countries' investments, increases by 4% and 2.2%, respectively, in the ﬁrst decades of the
century. Thus, our results show that spillovers enhance convergence among countries at the frontier, as
detailed in Table 2.
Among Low Income countries, we record reductions in investments for all countries except for SSA
(Sub-Saharan Africa) that slightly increases its investments when spillovers are introduced. However, as
shown in Table 3, during the ﬁrst decades of the century, reductions are inferior to those recorded for High
Income countries and thus their share of world R&D between 2002 and 2032 increases, ranging from 4.3%
for SSA to 1.3% for MENA (Middle East and North Africa). As a group, Low Income countries increase their
share of world investments between 2002 and 2082 and slightly invert the trend at the end of the century.
Summingup, our results showsomeconvergence in R&D investment shares amongHigh Income countries.
As a group, these countries lose ground in favour of Low Income countries in the ﬁrst decades of the century.
Hence, our formulation of international R&D Spillovers captures the convergence process from multiple
perspectives. It must also be stressed that these results are obtained within a stabilization scenario in which,
evenwithout spillovers, there is ahighdegree of convergence inR&D investments andknowledge stocks across
world regions. International spillovers thus reinforce an already strong underlying convergence process.19
Changes in the stock of R&D are instead negligible, as shown in Table 3. International knowledge inﬂows
substitute domestic investments and the cuts are spread across the economy. In addition, energy R&D
expenditures at the end of the century, when they are at their highest level, range from 0.12% to 0.02% of
GDP, respectively, for USA and SSA. Therefore, the change induced by spillovers is small in absolute terms.
As a consequence, gains in terms of stabilization costs are also negligible. As an example, over the whole
century, the USA save 72 USD Billions over a cumulated GDP of more than 2100 Trillions in our stabilization
scenario, i.e. a modest 0.003%.
Given that the stock of domestic R&D changes only slightly, and that we do not record any signiﬁcant
effect of spillovers on the available income, there is also no adjustment in the investment in all energy
technologies, and the price of emissions permits does not vary when spillovers are introduced. This also
explains the virtually unchanged distribution of emissions for all countries.
This result has been tested with different formulations, and follows from the fact that spillovers induce
limited R&D investment reductions. It should be stressed that the speciﬁcation of R&D that is subject to19 In order to control for differences between the two stabilization scenarios that might arise from small discrepancies between the
baselines with and without spillovers, we have also compared the changes in investments in R&D induced by the stabilization policy
with and without spillovers and we are able to conﬁrm the results illustrated in the text.
Table 3
Variation of share of world investments in energy R&D
2022 2042 2062 2082 2102
USA −1.8% −1.3% −0.9% −0.6% −0.3%
OLDEURO −0.3% −0.3% −0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
NEWEURO 3.4% 2.6% 2.0% 1.6% 1.1%
KOSAU 1.6% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5%
CAJANZ 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%
TE 2.6% 1.7% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6%
MENA 1.3% 0.4% −0.1% −0.3% −0.5%
SSA 4.3% 2.8% 2.1% 1.7% 1.2%
SASIA 2.4% 1.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2%
CHINA 1.7% 0.6% 0.1% −0.1% −0.2%
EASIA 2.2% 1.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0%
LACA 1.6% 0.8% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1%
HI −0.6% −0.4% −0.2% −0.1% 0.0%
LI 1.9% 0.9% 0.3% 0.1% −0.1%
2922 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929spillovers pertains only to the energy efﬁciency improvements of the economy. Stringent climate targets will
likely call for additional R&D activities aimed at developing new carbon free technologies (“backstops”).
4. GHG stabilization and technology diffusion: a policy exercise
Even though spillovers are shown to have a marginal impact on the amount and distribution of R&D
investments, and only a minor one on energy investments and overall stabilization costs, they may
nonetheless play an important role in shaping investment and emission strategies. Assume indeed that a set of
countries decide to adopt an energy R&D policy to stimulate the development of a new low-carbon energy
technology. The overall effects of this policy can be properly assessed only in a model with international
spillovers, where the beneﬁts of R&D investments are not limited to the countrywhere investments aremade.
As another example, consider a policy aimed at increasing the circulation of world knowledge, indistinctly
among regions orwith a special focus on some areas. This kind of policy intervention is frequently debated (Cf.
Barrett, 2001) and could be the core of a future GHG stabilization treaty (this is recommended, for example, in
the June 2007HeiligendammSummit Declaration). Again, the overall effects of such policy can only be studied
in models in which knowledge ﬂows are explicitly modelled.
Let us analyze, in this paper, a third case, inwhicha450ppmstabilizationpolicy, basedon the introductionof a
global permit market, is coupled to a policy to foster knowledge dissemination. Let us assume that emission
permits are distributed according to the Sovereignty rule as in the previous stabilization exercise. With such a
distribution of emissionpermits – rather extreme but often debated in the policy arena – complementary policies
toalleviate theburden fallingonLowIncomecountrieswouldbeneeded to redistribute the costof stabilizingGHG
concentrations. R&D cooperation policies are certainly among the most promising tools to attain this objective.
We consider here an R&D cooperation policy in which High Income countries use a fraction of the
revenues from emission permit sales to build absorption capacity in Low Income countries. This is
shown in Eq. (10), which modiﬁes Eq. (9):Z n; tð Þ ¼ aIR&D n; tð ÞbHE n; tð Þc HE n; tð Þ þ ABS n; tð ÞP
naHI HE n; tð Þ
  X
naHI
HE n; tð Þ  HE n; tð Þ
h i d
8naLI ð10Þ
ABS(n,t) is the Low Income countries absorption capacity stock, which derives from the ﬂow of R&Dwhere
cooperationaid,AID(t),ﬁnancedusinga fractionof the revenues fromcarbon tradingofHigh Incomecountries, CT
(n,t), and equally shared among the seven Low Income regions. ABS(n,t) evolves accordingly as shown in Eq. (11):ABS n; t þ 1ð Þ ¼ ABS n; tð Þ 1 dð Þ þ AID tð Þ
7
for naLI
AID tð Þ ¼ p tð ÞPnaHI CT n; tð Þ 
ð11Þ
e fraction π(t) of revenues from carbon trading devoted to fund R&D technology transfers andTh
cooperation declines across time as shown in Table 4. The world fund devoted to increasing absorption
capacity in Low Income countries ranges between 2 and 105 billion USD.
Table 4
Financial aid for R&D absorption capacity
2007 2022 2042 2062 2082 2102
π 78% 37% 14% 5% 2% 1%
AID (Billions, 1885 USD) 2 35 87 105 70 37
Table 5
Change of stabilization costs














HIGH INCOME 11.33 10.63
LOW INCOME −2.30 −1.55
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in Low Income countries by 2.3%, with respect to the standard stabilization policy examined in Section 3. High
Income countries suffer the loss of a fraction of carbon trading revenues and see stabilization costs increasing,
as a group, by 11.3% (but their quota ofworld stabilization costs remains fairly lowbecause of the application of
the sovereignty principle in allocating permits). Overall, as detailed in Table 5, we record a reduction of world
GHG stabilization costs.20
Low Income countries beneﬁt from enhanced absorption capacity and build larger and less expensive
stocks of Energy R&D, which increase energy efﬁciency and reduce dependency on carbon trading to meet
stabilization targets. The carbonmarket reacts to a lower demand of emission permits by lowering the price
of carbon (Fig. 1), which ultimately reinforces the beneﬁts of higher energy efﬁciency.
It is interesting to see that the increase of foreign knowledge spillovers associated with a higher
absorption capacity creates, in itself, a greater ﬂow of new ideas, but it also increases the productivity of
domestic R&D and thus stimulates larger investments in knowledge, as shown in Table 6. R&D investments
in High Income countries decrease, but not enough to offset the increment of R&D investments in Low
Income countries, and the world as a whole is now set on a new path with overall higher Energy R&D
expenditures.
It is reasonable to wonder if the same gains could be achieved with a simpler, non-targeted, lump-sum
transfer of the same amount of resources from High Income to Low Income countries. We tested this
alternative policy by adding to the budget constraint of Low Income countires the same amount of
resources that were used to increase absorption capacity (AID) and we found that this would be a less
efﬁcient way for transferring income to Low Income countries. Table 5 shows that global stabilization costs
would still be lower when a redistribution policy is implemented, but gains are greater when the same
amount of resources is targeted to increase absorption capacity.21 The additional resources are spread
across a variety of investment opportunities (not least, consumption itself) instead of being channelled to20 The change is very high for OLDEURO because its initially very low level of stabilization costs magniﬁes, in percentage terms, the
income transfer.
21 Sub-Saharan Africa is a notable exception; this may suggest that for very poor countries income support policies can be more
valuable than interventions on R&D sectors which are still too underdeveloped.
Fig. 1. Change of carbon price induced by the R&D absorption policy and the transfer policy.
2924 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929achieve higher energy efﬁciency. As a result, the non-targeted cooperation policy does not induce a lower
worldwide path of abatement costs, as shown by the largely unchanged pattern of carbon price in Fig. 1.
Why would this happen if countries are still free to allocate all their resources to greater R&D investment?
At least in part, this would happen because under the untargeted transfer policy each single country would
be a price taker and would act in an uncoordinated fashion in the carbon market: it would not perceive the
beneﬁt of increasing energy efﬁciency in terms of lower carbon prices and, were it to perceive it, strategic
consideration would anyway prevent it from acting in an uncoordinated manner.
The set of strategic interactions in the carbon market does not change with a policy that increases
absorption capacity, but in this case resources would be channelled towards energy efﬁciency
improvements and the whole policy would act as a coordination mechanism.
Thanks to the multi-faceted non-cooperative structure of our model it would be possible to examine a
wide variety of other R&D policies in a stabilization context and the one presented above was meant to
provide just a taste of other possible exercises. Interesting insights could be derived by studying, for
example, (1) knowledge cooperation policies among High Income countries, (2) lower exogenous
constraints to knowledge appropriability, (3) cooperation regimes between signatory and non-signatory
countries. Despite these very interesting developments, the focus of this paper wants to be on
methodological issues and we will leave the analysis of further policy scenarios to future exercises.
5. Sensitivity analysis
As previously discussed, there is some uncertainty over the value to be assigned to the elasticity of
knowledge creation in international R&D spillovers. We therefore tested the robustness of our ﬁndings by
attributing different values to this elasticity. Given the shortage of empirical estimates for this parameter,
we used the values of similar variables included in the model – especially the value of elasticity of
knowledge creation in domestic investments – and performed sensitivity analyses relative to this
benchmark.
Speciﬁcally, we used a symmetric interval around the central value of 0.15 by setting 0.20 and 0.10 as
upper and lower bounds, respectively. With the upper bound value, the elasticity of knowledge creation to
international spillovers is greater than 0.18, which is the value of domestic investments. 0.20 is thus a
considerably high level for parameter d. With the lower bound, instead, we allow for a sufﬁciently low
relevance of international R&D spillovers by assuming that a 1% increase of foreign knowledge is almost half
as powerful as a 1% increase in domestic investment in creating new ideas.22
Sensitivity analysis shows that for all values of the parameter d considered, investments in energy R&D
in a 450 ppmv stabilization scenario decline in almost all countries when spillovers are explicitly modelled
(the only exception is SSA). This adds robustness to the results described in the previous section.22 For each value of the parameter d that we test in the sensitivity analysis a new baseline has been recalibrated by varying the
coefﬁcient c which governs intertemporal spillovers inside each region.
Table 6
Change of R&D capital and R&D investments when absorption capacity building policy is implemented
R&D capital at 2102 R&D investments (cumulative, 2002–2102)
450+R&D absorption (%) 450+transfer (%) 450+R&D absorption (%) 450+transfer (%)
USA 0 0 −1 0
OLDEURO 0 0 −1 0
NEWEURO 0 0 −1 0
KOSAU 0 0 −1 0
CAJANZ 0 0 −1 0
TE 56 0 6 0
MENA 46 0 3 0
SSA 93 0 13 0
SASIA 53 0 4 0
CHINA 46 0 3 0
EASIA 53 0 4 0
LACA 47 0 3 0
WORLD 25 0 1 0
HIGH INCOME 0 0 −1 0
LOW INCOME 52 0 4 0
2925V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929Figs. 2–5 show, for different years, the relationship found between parameter d and the magnitude of
cuts in energy R&D investments, with respect to the stabilization scenario without spillovers. The strongest
responses are recorded fromHigh Income countries, but the sensitivity of Low Income countries progresses
over time, reaches its maximum before the end of the century, and then regresses to converge towards
values similar to those found for High Income countries. For these countries we ﬁnd instead a constantly
declining responsiveness to spillovers across time.
This implies that our model yields different reactions to spillovers as a function of the degree of economic
development (the level of knowledge accumulation). Because of their low absorption capacity, Low Income
countries are initially prevented from reaping the full beneﬁts of the available international pool of
technologies. However, as their knowledge stock increases, and as the productivity of domestic investments is
gradually enhanced by foreign investments, Low Incomecountries becomemore reactive to foreign knowledge
ﬂows.
Let us now consider the responsiveness of domestic investments to international spillovers in the ﬁrst
half of the century. In case of “standing-on-shoulders” effects, as inWITCH, investments in the next decades
will be crucial to determine future knowledge stocks and energy intensities in the subsequent decades. It is
thus important to understand the effect of knowledge spillovers on these early investments. We have seen
that while Low Income countries investments' decisions are relatively rigid with respect to the degree of
international spillovers, High Income countries show a higher margin of variation, that ranges from −2.8%
to −6% in 2012. This result bears some meaningful implications: empirical research should above all beFig. 2. Change of R&D investments in 2012, wrt to the Baseline Scenario, for different values assigned to parameter d.
Fig. 4. Change of R&D investments in 2062, wrt to the Baseline Scenario, for different values assigned to parameter d.
Fig. 3. Change of R&D investments in 2022, wrt to the Baseline Scenario, for different values assigned to parameter d.
2926 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929addressed to estimate the impact of energy R&D spillovers on High Income countries, and the lack of
reliable data on Low Income countries should not prevent us from performing model simulations.
The shadowed areas in Figs. 6 and 7 show the range of reductions in R&D investments for USA and
CHINA, with respect to the stabilization scenario without spillovers. The area included between the two
extreme parameter values of 0.10 and 0.20 has been shadowed to highlight the range of values found; the
dotted lines correspond to intermediate values assigned to the parameter d and the solid line corresponds
to the central value 0.15. As noted above, the widest range is recorded for the country with the highest levelFig. 5. Change of R&D investments in 2102, wrt to the Baseline Scenario, for different values assigned to parameter d.
Fig. 6. Change of R&D investments in USA, wrt to the Baseline Scenario, for the range of values assigned to parameter d.
Fig. 7. Change of R&D investments in CHINA, wrt to the Baseline Scenario, for the range of values assigned to parameter d.
2927V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929of capital per capita.23 CHINA starts from low ranges, but as income per capita and knowledge increase, and
spillovers become more important, the range increases as well. This is due to the bell-shaped curve that
governs spillovers, as explained in Section 2.
6. Conclusions
In order to achieve the emission reductions needed for stabilizing GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere at safe levels, new technologies must be developed to soften the link between economic/
demographic growth and carbon emissions. The development of technologies that allow for a more
efﬁcient use of energy is part of this effort and it will certainly play a substantial role in any future
stabilization policy. New technologies like hybrid vehicles, for example, allow for a substantial reduction of
energy consumption, while delivering the same services. More efﬁcient air conditioning systems would
signiﬁcantly cut energy consumption, while preserving comfort conditions.
The discovery of new technologies and the development of new ideas is, at least partially, a public good
that freely ﬂows across different ﬁrms, industries and world regions. Thanks to this ﬂow of ideas, the
development of new technologies spreads across ﬁrms, industries and world regions from an initially very
narrow set of innovators. The development of new technologies is concentrated in a fewworld regions, and
international spillovers have a potential role to play in assuring a wider diffusion of new discoveries.
Greater knowledge ﬂows will make it easier and less costly to achieve energy efﬁciency gains.
This paper contributes to the literature on the costs of GHG stabilization by providing a ﬁrst assessment of
the potential role of international knowledge ﬂows in fostering the development of new energy technologies.
Disembodied international energy R&D spillovers aremodelled in theWITCHmodel. The amount of spillovers
entering eachworld region depends on a pool of freely available knowledge and on the ability of each country
to beneﬁt from it, i.e. on its absorption capacity. Knowledge acquired fromabroad combineswith the domestic
knowledge stock and investments, thus contributing to the production of new technologies at home.23 A similar behaviour is found for Old Europe (OLDEURO) and Canada, Japan and New Zealand (CAJANZ).
2928 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2912–2929We focused on the stabilization of world CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere at 450 ppmv by the
end of the 21st century (550 ppmv when considering all gases) and showed that, when international
knowledge spillovers are explicitly modelled, optimal energy R&D investments are lower than
previously estimated. In particular, the strongest free-riding effects are recorded among High Income
countries. The reason lies in the greater exposure of these economies to the international exchange of
ideas, and thus on greater beneﬁts in terms of potential investment savings. However, thanks to
spillovers, total knowledge stocks remain unchanged and the main gain for each country is a lower
expenditure in energy R&D. These savings are not negligible in absolute terms, but are only a small
share of the overall stabilization bill. The result is that stabilization costs are only slightly changed by
endogenizing international energy R&D spillovers.
Sensitivity analysis revealed that these ﬁndings are robust to a range of values attributed to the elasticity
of new knowledge creation to international R&D spillovers. High Income countries are more sensitive to
variations of the parameter than Low Income countries, especially in the ﬁrst decades of the century. Given
the lack of empirical evidence on the actual role of international spillovers in the development of domestic
technologies, it is worth concentrating the efforts in studying knowledge dynamics in High Income
countries.
Our analysis has focused on innovation in terms of improved energy efﬁciency. Although energy
efﬁciency is considered to be one of the most important mitigation strategies, and one that encompasses a
variety of technologies, stringent stabilization will arguably require innovation to decarbonise the use of
energy, and thus R&D “backstops” might prove crucial. We leave this for future analysis, along with the
investigation of additional dynamics such as spillovers to the energy sector from other sectors, or spillovers
among ﬁrms, that are likely to play an important role.24
We believe this paper has achieved some relevant results in terms of policy. International spillovers are
indeed an important policy channel. This is why we focused our analysis on a policy-mix in which a
stabilization policy based on a global permit market is coupled with a technology policy based on transfers
designed to enhance the absorption capacity in Low Income countries. The new model that we developed
enabled us to assess the implications of such a policy-mix. Our results show that this policy-mix can reduce
the costs of stabilizing GHG emissions. More speciﬁcally, without policies targeted to enhance absorption
capacity, lump-sum income transfers do not reduce signiﬁcantly the cost of ambitious stabilization targets.
Low Income countries have barriers that prevent them from absorbing international knowledge spillovers.
Hence, exchanges of ideas remain conﬁned to High Income countries, where the overwhelming majority of
R&D investments takes place. However, even with greater absorption capacity, the main effect is a
substitution of foreign to domestic efforts, as has been found optimal for High Income countries. Therefore,
greater knowledge ﬂows and higher investments in absorption capacity in Low Income countries must
necessarily be combined with speciﬁc measures aimed at reducing free-riding incentives.
It is worth noting that during the 2007 G8 Summit at Heiligendamm, in Germany, complementary-
technology-agreements for contrasting climate change and increasing energy security have been strongly
advocated. The ﬁnal Summit Declaration explicitly asks for “unprecedented international cooperation” in
developing new technologies.25 In the spirit of the Heiligendamm Declaration, our policy exercise
reinforces this message, emphasizing the key role of this type of policy intentervention.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.
eneco.2008.04.008.
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